This paper examines the nature of civic culture and the strength of civic attitudes in postcommunist and western countries. In particular, it seeks to explore the internal consistency and durability of civic culture using World Values Survey and European Values Study data. It discusses three perspectives on the strength and durability of civic attitudes in East and West, (the historical roots, the legacy of communism, and the post-communist transition perspectives) and explores to what extent the pattern of civic attitudes in the two regions matches the predicted outcomes of these perspectives. The paper finds that the attitudes associated with civic culture do not form a coherent syndrome, neither at the individual nor at the societal level. It further finds only marginal support for the historical perspective, which accords a great degree of persistence to civic culture. It therefore concludes that civic culture is not the monolithic and durable phenomenon that some cultural theorists claim it is.
Introduction
A popular thesis in the social sciences is that civic traditions are more salient in Western Europe than in Central and Eastern Europe. Among the scholars who subscribe to this view, there are many who have located the origin of the difference in the pre-modern past. Typically they see the appearance of autonomous cities in many parts of Western Europe in the late Middle Ages as the key factor (Bloch 1961 , Chirot 1989 . These cities prevented the Monarchy, the Nobility and the Church from exerting a stifling absolute rule and provided shelter for a growing class of entrepreneurs, merchants, craftsmen and clerks, who through their various forms of association and cooperation, in which they participated as equals, developed the attitudinal and behavioural patterns associated with civic culture. By contrast, Central and Eastern Europe, it is argued, lack a history of strong independent cities, and therefore the classes seen as supporting civic culture could not mature there to a sufficient degree. The rise of the absolutist state in this region (Russia, Prussia and Austria) actually exacerbated social inequalities as the aristocracy imposed ever more restrictions and duties on the peasant serfs to compensate for the imposition of central taxes needed for the institution of a permanent army (Anderson 1974) . Only by brutally suppressing the occasional peasant revolts could the militarized states of the East maintain a fragile and stagnant social order. Under these feudal, violent and hierarchical conditions, which lasted up to the (late) arrival of modernization, civic culture could not flourish. Neither could modernization bring about a change of values as its specific brand in Central and Eastern Europe was too top-down, too artificial or too much imposed by foreign forces to be able to cultivate the civic-democratic patterns of Western Europe. Barrington Moore (1966) , for instance, argues that the involvement of the aristocracy and the state in the industrialization of Germany and Japan proved fatal for the development of democracy in these countries. Instead of national identities based on civic-democratic principles, Eastern nations developed allegiances based on kinship, race, language and folk history, so the story goes.
A well-known historian agreeing to this version of events is Hans Kohn (1944; 1994) . He added a normative and thus provocative dimension to the civic-West / ethnicEast framework by contending that civic identities are conducive to democracy, tolerance and freedom while ethnic thinking is the necessary companion of authoritarianism, oppression and xenophobia. Unsurprisingly, it is precisely this normative element (civic = "good"; ethnic = "bad") that has inspired a heated debate in the study of nationalism in recent years. Scholars have attacked the framework on historical grounds by arguing that Western nations, like Eastern ones, have ethnic roots (Smith 1986 ) and have pursued exclusionary policies towards ethnic others in the past (Kuzio 2002) . Theoretically, the dichotomy has been criticised for employing categories (ethnic; civic) that collapse too many unrelated notions (Kymlicka 1999a) , and for failing to note that nations defining themselves in civic terms, such as the Latin American countries, need not always have strong democratic traditions (Nielsen 1999) . Lastly, academics have questioned its empirical validity by observing that the variation within the West and within the East is larger than that between the regions in terms of how people understand their national identities (Shulman 2002) . Given the profound criticism the framework has attracted, and notably the Hans Kohn variety, it has few supporters today in the field of nationalism.
Remarkably, in their analyses of the Kohn dichotomy students of nationalism have only assessed whether national identities are conceived in civic or ethnic terms, not the substance of civic culture itself. In other words they have not explored whether the citizenries of the West and the East differ in levels of social trust, participation in nonstate organizations and public spiritedness, elements which are usually associated with civic culture. This theme has been the exclusive domain of social capital theory, a strand of research that has rapidly developed after the publication of Robert Putnam"s influential work Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (1993) . In this book Putnam argues that the presence of civic culture in the northern part of Italy and its absence in the South is the key explanation for the differential rate of success of regional government in the country. In tracing the roots of civic culture, he closely follows the historical argument outlined above: in the free cities of the North civic associations of equals based on trust, norms of reciprocity and perceptions of the common good thrived, while the sophisticated authoritarian state apparatus left behind by the powerful Norman king Frederick II in the thirteenth century precluded similar processes from occurring in the South. By locating the origins of civic culture in the Middle Ages and by seeing it as the single most important factor shaping the performance of political institutions, Putnam accords a great amount of stability, solidity and explanatory power to civic culture. Although in later works he concedes that civic culture in its turn is affected by economic, political and technological developments (Putnam 2000, Putnam and Goss 2002) , the emphasis is clearly on the reverse relationship in Making Democracy Work. On top of that, Putnam considers civic culture to embody a distinct set of interrelated attitudes. People in a civic community, he writes, "on most accounts, are more than merely active, public-spirited, and equal. Virtuous citizens are helpful, respectful, and trustful toward one another" (1993, p. 88) . The idea of civic culture as a coherent syndrome of dispositions is expressed even clearer in Bowling Alone:
people who trust their fellow citizens volunteer more often, contribute more readily to charity, participate more often in politics and community organizations, serve more readily in juries, give blood more frequently, comply more fully with their tax obligations, are more tolerant of minority views, and display many other forms of civic virtue (Putnam 2000, p. 137). According to Jackman and Miller (2005) , Putnam is certainly not alone in assuming civic culture to be a coherent and durable phenomenon that is relatively impervious to political and economic events. These assumptions, in their view, are characteristic of culture theorists in general, i.e. of those scholars who hold culture to be the key factor shaping societal trends, whether it is Weber (Protestantism), Banfield (amoral familism) or Huntingdon (civilizations based on religion).
In this paper I focus on these crucial assumptions. I will examine the coherence and durability of civic culture by analyzing the nature of civic culture and the strength of civic attitudes in East and West. I rely on data from the 1990, 1995 and 1999 editions of the World Values Survey (WVS) and on the 1999 edition of the European Values Study (1999) to explore these issues. The first section of the paper discusses the various approaches to civic culture, the relation of the concept to the more commonly used notion of social capital, and the coherence of civic culture at both the individual and societal level. Subsequently, the paper compares the nature of civic culture in western countries and transition states. The last section introduces three perspectives on civic culture: the historical roots idea outline above, a perspective stressing the legacy of communism and a theory on the effects of post-communist transition. Each of these perspectives accords a different degree of malleability to civic culture and predicts a slightly different pattern of civic values across and within East and West. By comparing the explanatory value of these perspectives, I will arrive at conclusions about the solidity of civic culture in general.
The relevance of examining the consistency and durability of civic culture is obvious as the phenomenon is often seen as a precondition for democracy and the rule of law (see discussion below). If civic culture is indeed crucial for democracy and it is as one-dimensional and difficult to generate as cultural theorists contend, then all attempts to introduce democracy in non-civic environments (e.g. the Anglo-American efforts in Iraq) would appear to be a waste of time and energy. The results of this study, however, give the missionaries of democracy some grounds for optimism. Neither at the individual nor at the societal level does civic culture appear to be a cohesive one-dimensional syndrome. Only some aspects of civic culture seem to be quite durable as their crosscountry patterns are reasonably well explained by the historical perspective. Most aspects would appear to be quite changeable since their distributions are more in line with the two perspectives that see civic culture as a more pliable phenomenon. These findings imply that "civic culture" needs to be understood as no more than an umbrella term embracing a collection of highly diverse values which are more pliable than is often thought. This suggests that socio-economic and political transformations do have the potential to bring about a desired change in values, also in traditionally "uncivic" environments.
Civic Culture and Social Capital
How has academia understood and evaluated civic culture? A review of the literature reveals, first of all, that the term is subject to much confusion as there seem to be as many definitions of civic culture as there are scholars writing about the subject. These definitions are partly overlapping and partly diverging. All of them for instance stress attitudes such as public spiritedness, participation and tolerance but only some include critical engagement (Kymlicka 1999b (Kymlicka , 2002 or certain economic virtues (Galston 1991). Moreover, although essentially referring to the same phenomenon, each scholar employs his or her own distinctive labels. Thus, whereas Almond and Verba (1963) indeed speak of "civic culture", Putnam (1993) uses "civic community", and Kymlicka (2002) and Galston (1991) speak of "civic virtues" and "liberal virtues", respectively.
These differences however hide one important similarity. In an echo of Kohn, all four scholars see civic culture as a sine qua non for democracy. In other words, even with all the institutional arrangements in place, a democracy will not function effectively and will not be sustainable in the long run if it is not supported by an active and engaged citizenry. As Kymlicka (1999 Kymlicka ( , 2002 explains, this has become painstakingly clear from events in the post-colonial world, where political elites have abused the state apparatus to favour their own ethnic group or class at the expense of others. In order to prevent irresponsible elites from hijacking the state, he argues, a democracy needs a citizenry that critically scrutinizes policy, holds politicians accountable, and actively engages in public affairs through reasoned and civilized deliberation. These for him are the core civic virtues on which democracy rests. Though having a broader understanding of civic culture than Kymlicka, Almond and Verba, as the pioneers in this field of study, would also subscribe to the view that democracy is upheld by politically active citizens. They see civic culture as an all-inclusive phenomenon comprising participant attitudes in addition to the more traditional parochial and subject orientations, yet hold only participant attitudes to be distinctive of democracies: "In general, a parochial, subject, or participant culture would be most congruent with, respectively, a traditional political structure, a centralized authoritarian structure and a democratic political structure" (Almond and Verba, 1963, p. 20) . Espousing a similarly broad view of civic culture, Galston clusters a variety of social, economic and political virtues under the label "liberal virtues" and argues that a majority of citizens must have these qualities for democracy to perform well:
When I speak of certain virtues as instrumental to the preservation of liberal communities, I mean not that every citizen must possess these virtues but, rather, that most citizens must. The broad hypothesis is that as the proportion of non-virtuous citizens increases significantly, the ability of liberal societies to function successfully progressively diminishes (Galston 1991, p. 220) .
The vast literature on social capital has likewise mainly focused on the link between social networks, as the core component of social capital, and democracy. Central to the debate has been the question whether high levels of civic associations and activity are always conducive to social trust and democracy. Critics of social capital theory have argued that organizations based on ethnic, religious or other cultural commonalities, particularly in culturally diverse societies, could well reinforce existing divisions, promote distrust between communities and therefore complicate democratic government (Portess and Landholt 1996; Dowley and Silver 2002; Norris 2002; Green, Preston and Sabates 2003) . Advocates of the theory have responded that a distinction needs to be made between bonding (exclusive) and bridging (inclusive) forms of association. Bonding networks are good for "thick" interpersonal trust, solidarity and psychological security, but they need to be complemented by bridging networks which, though based on weak ties, help individuals in getting access to new information and expanding their horizons. It is the bridging rather than the bonding forms of social capital that hold society together (De Souza Briggs 1998 , Putnam 2000 Putnam and Goss 2002) .
The preoccupation of social capital theory with democracy and social cohesion seems to have diverted attention away from issues of coherence and conceptual clarity. How does social capital for instance relate to civic culture? While some authors use the terms interchangeably, others, Putnam included, seem to regard social capital as a specific subset or core component of the values associated with civic culture. Defining social capital as "features of social organization, such as trust, norms [of reciprocity, JGJ] and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions" (Putnam 1993, p. 167) , he sees the phenomenon as capable of not only reproducing itself, but also of engendering the other characteristics of the civic community. Perhaps because social capital in most accounts is a more parsimonious concept than civic culture, it has largely replaced the latter in cultural theory and political science. Yet, given the widely diverging definitions of civic culture and Putnam"s insistence on seeing it as a coherent syndrome of attitudes (see above), it is surprising that the concept of civic culture has not drawn more attention from the academic community.
Interestingly, Putnam (1993) himself did explore the internal consistency of the concept. Using aggregate data at the regional level, he discovered a one-dimensional syndrome of the "civic community" consisting of preference voting, referendum turnout, newspaper readership and density of sports and cultural associations, but, as Jackman and Miller (1996) rightly point out, this construct captures only aggregates of behavioural indices and does not include attitudes, values and dispositions. In response to this criticism, Brehm and Rahn (1997) have shown that a social capital syndrome comprising both a behavioural indicator (civic associations) and an attitude (interpersonal trust) does exist at the individual level. Their analysis, however, does not cover the many other notions associated with civic culture and is only based on data from the United States (the General Social Survey). It is quite feasible that different patterns emerge in other countries. Moreover, they have not explored the conceptual boundaries of their construct. We thus do not know to what extent it can be separated from concepts in the semantic vicinity.
Related to the issue of coherence is the question on which level civic culture is operating and how it compares in this regard to social capital. Scholars are not in agreement regarding the nature of the latter. On the one hand there are those who view social capital as a private good which can be mobilised by individuals to accumulate wealth and status (Bourdieu 1993) or to engage in politics and attain political goals (Olson 1972) . Other scholars consider social capital to be a property of a community rather than an individual (Putnam 1993; Newton 2001; Norris 2002) . In their view, the public good character of social capital means that individuals living in a society with high levels of social capital automatically benefit from this situation irrespective of their contribution to the phenomenon (van Deth 2001). They also hold social capital to be selfperpetuating and reinforcing. In other words, individuals cannot be excluded from the consumption of social capital, but this is not problematic since consumption increases rather than decreases overall stocks of social capital. Remarkably, though seeing social capital as a public good, Putnam argues that its components also cluster at the individual level:
Our discussion of trends in social connectedness and civic engagement has tacitly assumed that all the forms of social capital that we have discussed are themselves coherently correlated across individuals. This is in fact true. Members of associations are much more likely than non-members to participate in politics, to spend time with neighbors, to express social trust and so on (quoted in Badescu and Uslaner 2003, p. 8).
Likewise, as illustrated by the quotations above, he considers individuals in the "civic community" to display a range of civic virtues simultaneously. Thus, in Putnam"s philosophy, there should at least be a coherent syndrome of civic culture at the individual level. On top of that, social capital, as the set of core characteristics of civic culture, should constitute a one-dimensional phenomenon at both the individual and the societal level. The idea of social capital as a distinct societal phenomenon has, however, been questioned by Green, Preston and Janmaat (2006) . They argue that contextual factors operating at the societal level may have such a large impact on trust and association as the core characteristics of social capital that in their aggregate these characteristics are no longer interrelated. To illustrate their argument they note that the Nordic countries combine high levels of trust with moderate levels of associations while the reverse applies in the USA. In the following I explore to what extent survey data support the idea of a distinct syndrome of civic attitudes at either the individual or societal level.
The problem of conceptual coherence and the public or private nature of civic culture have obvious relevance for this paper as civic culture may be understood in different ways across the East and the West. I will turn to this issue in the next section. First I assess to what extent the elements of civic culture cluster at both the individual and the societal level using the pooled data of Eastern and Western countries (I labelled countries with a communist past as "Eastern" and all others as "Western" 1 ). To begin with the individual level, when would civic culture, statistically speaking, be accepted as an internally homogenous and externally distinctive concept? It would be accepted as such if the notions it includes meet two conditions: (1) the correlations amongst them are stronger than those between them and concepts not associated with civic culture, (2) these correlations are in the expected direction. To take an example, the civic culture elements of participation and social trust should be more closely related to one another than either of the two with, say, baldheadedness at age 30, and this correlation should be positivei.e. those participating should be more trusting than those not participating.
I employed the set of characteristics Putnam (1993, pp. 87-89) ascribes to the civic community to identify the civic culture indicators in the WVS and EVS data bases (see Table 1 ). The table also states how these indicators will be referred to in the following. Subsequently, I correlated the civic culture items with each other and with items not associated with civic culture -level of education, feeling of happiness, state of health, importance of work vs. leisure (see Table 2 2 ). To be sure, these non-civic items are likely to show a link with the civic culture items (notably education), but if these links are stronger than the relations among the civic culture items themselves, the conceptual coherence of civic culture is undermined. The results of Table 2 support the idea of a coherent syndrome of civic culture at the individual level only to a certain degree. The good news for civic culture theorists is that the correlations amongst the indicators of civic culture are nearly all in the expected direction (only 2 out of 66 correlations do not conform to the expected pattern). The bad news, however, is that the correlations amongst the civic culture items are not stronger than those between the civic and the non-civic items (while 16 out of 36 civicXnoncivic correlations are larger than 0.1, roughly the same proportion (29 out of 66) applies to the civicXcivic correlations which are larger than 0.1). The overall level of correlations, moreover, is low with many correlations not exceeding the value of 0.25. The vast majority of the correlations are significant but this is only because of the high number of respondents (N > 37,000 for all correlations). In sum, the data for all countries combined do support Putnam"s claim that more politically engaged individuals are also more trusting, helpful, tolerant etc, but the links between these civic virtues are not very strong and many are as closely linked to notions not associated with civic culture. There is thus no evidence of a clearly demarcated syndrome of civic culture at the individual level. One could equally well cluster the items of Table 2 completely differently and argue that a certain group combining civic and non-civic items represents the syndrome of, say, "positive outlook on life". Table 1 about here   Table 2 
about here
Let us now see if a more convincing syndrome of civic culture can be found at the societal level. I used national aggregates of the WVS/EVS items to explore this issue.
3 It 2 The scales of a number of items have been reversed to ensure that a positive correlation between two civic items always denotes a relationship in the expected direction. The answers to the civic items have been interpreted in the following way: Discuss politics with friends: the more often -the more civic Signing a petition: have done -the more civic Jobs scarce priority men: disagree -the more civic Jobs scarce priority own nationality: disagree -the more civic Most people can be trusted / can"t be too careful: most people can be trusted -the more civic Proportion of compatriots claiming state benefits: the less mentioned -the more civic Not like as neighbors, immigrants and foreign workers: not mentioned -the more civic Not like as neighbors, homosexuals: not mentioned -the more civic Number of different organizations, belonging to: the higher the number -the more civic Number of different organization, doing voluntary work for: the higher the number -the more civic 3 Obviously, the national level is only one of the collective levels at which civic culture could operate.
Putnam for instance observed varying levels of civic traditions across regions within Italy. It must therefore be acknowledged that country aggregate data can hide important internal differences. Another matter is whether aggregate data can be used at all to measure a phenomenon at the societal level. According to van Deth (2001) , the cross-correlation of aggregate data only reproduces relationships found at the micro-level. Aggregate date would thus not be an appropriate tool to study macro-level phenomena. I disagree.
turns out that the pattern of correlations at the societal level differs in two ways from that found at the individual level (see Table 3 for the correlations between national aggregates). First, there are more cases of unexpected relations between civic culture items. Notably the items "discuss politics with friends" and "compatriots unjustly claiming state benefits" are correlated negatively with several other items, although these correlations are not significant. Second, the correlations between the civic items are much stronger with 39 out of 66 binary correlations having values that exceed 0.40. This difference, however, is obviously related to the number of units on which the analysis was performed as the N in the correlations of aggregates is only a fraction of that in the correlations of individual level data. Indeed, as was the case at the individual level, the civic indices are as strongly correlated to the non-civic items as to each other.
Table 3 about here
To probe the data further and explore underlying dimensions, I performed a principle component analysis on both levels of data (see Table 4 ). The results of these analyses confirm that correlations between aggregates are stronger than those between individual level items. Whereas the (varimax-rotated) solution for the individual level finds as much as five dimensions which together explain a mere 52.4 per cent of the variance, the three dimensions extracted at the aggregate level account for no less than 77.7 per cent of the variance. Moreover, while each of the dimensions at the individual level is clustering items that refer to one component of civic culture only, the societal dimensions unite items which belong to different components. The first societal dimension, for instance, combines the items referring to political equality, trust and tolerance with passive participation (factor loadings of .60 and more), and explains an impressive 35.4 per cent of the variance even in a rotated solution. By contrast, the first dimension at the individual level only groups the two items representing solidarity and accounts for just 12.2 per cent of the variance. Yet, and most importantly, there is not a single dimension capturing all or almost all of the components of civic culture at either of the two levels. Even at the macro-level, the first dimension faces strong competition from the second dimension which groups four civic items and collects almost as much of the variance as the first dimension (28.9 per cent). Moreover, both these dimensions are "polluted" by a non-civic item which also shows a high loading on the extracted factors. In short, neither at the individual nor at the societal level can a convincing syndrome of civic culture be found, i.e. a syndrome that is internally homogenous and externally distinctive. Interestingly, even the elements of the more restricted concept of social capital do not neatly group in one dimension at the societal level (active participation is the dissident as it loads on the second dimension). This means that the idea of social capital as a distinct phenomenon with the characteristics of a public good is not fully supported either.
Table 4 about here
Theoretically, it is possible that a relationship at the macro-level between aggregates of individual characteristics is not manifested at the micro-level. It is for instance feasible that overall levels of civic values are high in a country while individuals in this country vary in the degree of support for these values.
The Nature of Civic Culture in East and West
As noted before, issues of conceptual coherence and level of analysis have an obvious relevance for the topic of this paper as the nature of civic culture may differ across geographical contexts. Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer (1997) for instance have argued that civic cooperation takes a completely different form in the postcommunist countries in comparison to the West. In the former, informal social networks with minimal links to the state predominate. This has been the legacy, the authors contend, of decades of totalitarian rule in which the relations between the state and the citizen were characterized by oppression, dependency and arbitrariness. Under these conditions, citizens developed a profound distrust in the state and in institutions under its control. Contacts with the state and formal institutions were minimized for fear of unexpected persecution, and if contacts were unavoidable the prevailing attitude was one of exploiting the state before it exploits you. The result of all this, Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer explain, has been the appearance in communist times of an hourglass society, composed of a mass of citizens minding their own business at the bottom, economic and political elites vying for power and wealth at the top, and a "missing middle" of minimal connections between these two groups (p. 91). Given these circumstances, it is no surprise that independent civic organizations, when they were finally permitted to exist alongside official institutions towards the end of the 1980s, quickly defined themselves in opposition to the state and the Communist Party (Smolar 1996) . In the civic democracies of the West, by contrast, the individual is connected to the state through a network of informal and formal civic associations that negotiate with the state rather than blindly oppose it. Summing up, in the transition states there is a sharp rift between the private and the public, between the informal and the formal, while these domains are closely interwoven in the West. Communist rule, however, has not only isolated individuals from the state but also from each other. In a society where the state makes use of informers to spy on its citizens, you "really cannot be too careful in dealing with people" as Uslaner (2003, p. 81) explains. The result has been, he notes, that people distrust strangers and will only share their innermost thoughts and political convictions with family and close friends. Networks of acquaintances and friends therefore tend to be much smaller, though perhaps at the same time much more intense and focussed, than in the West. In similar vein, Schoepflin (2000, p. 155) has argued that the authoritarian nature of communism not only strengthened vertical links of dependency but also undermining horizontal bonds of solidarity: "The hyperétatism of communism predictably produced (…) forms of dependence and individuation, in which interpersonal connections and interactions, other than those within the family and with very close friends, were laden with suspicion, distrust and a zero-sum game mentality, to create an atomised society". In this environment, he contends, ethnic loyalties prevailed as they were the only bonds people could rely upon to counter feelings of alienation and atomisation.
Because of the alleged different nature of citizen-state and inter-citizen relationships, social capital in the transition countries has mainly been understood and examined as a micro-level phenomenon reflecting informal social networks (Mateju 2002) . Indeed, describing the coping strategies of three entrepreneurs in Hungary, Swain (2003) argues that the Bourdieu approach to social capital, which defines the concept as "contacts with influential people" and therefore sees it as the property of an individual, is better equipped to analyse social relations in post-communist countries than the public good type of social capital advocated by Putnam. If civic relations in the East are as different as is claimed, what syndrome, or non-syndrome, of civic culture can we expect to find at the individual level using the indicators introduced in the previous section? As most of the indicators refer to citizen-state relations (political activity; civic honesty; passive and active participation 4 -see once again Table 1 ), to relations with the anonymous other (social trust), and to relations with people with different lifestyles or different ethnic backgrounds (sexual tolerance; ethnic tolerance), we would expect levels of civic attitudes to be low across most indicators. This would have the effect of mitigating the correlations between them to the point they would no longer be significant or show a reversed sign. Among the remaining indicators, political discussions is the only one that seems to represent the informal social capital held to be so typical of the East. As it is not so much interest in politics per se as the way in which this interest is expressed, on which the regions are seen to differ, levels of political discussians are expected to be at least as high in the East in comparison to the West. The variation this produces on the indicator should be reflected in the correlations of this indicator with the other indicators of civic culture, which are likely to be of a higher magnitude.
Let us see if the data confirm these conjectures. Table 5 presents the correlations between the civic culture items for the two regions separately. It appears that the correlations are indeed weaker in the transition countries. Out of 66 correlations in total 29 correlations in the West and 19 in the East have values of 0.10 or more. Seven correlations in the West and 18 in the East are not significant at the .05 level or show a reversed sign. Moreover, while in the West these seven correlations are confined to the two items representing solidarity, in the East the 18 correlations affect many more components of civic culture. Remarkably though, it is political activity, passive participation and the two solidarity indicators that show the highest correlations with other civic items in the East, not political discussions as we might have expected. What is more, the interregional differences are not dramatic. In both regions the vast majority of correlations are in the expected direction -in fact in only two cases in the West and five cases in the East is the sign reversed. Thus, civic values form an even weaker complex at the micro-level in the East as compared to the West, but this syndrome does not seem to be radically different. However, to fully explore the "bad effects of communism" argument, the levels of civic culture in the two regions have to be examined, which is what the next section does. 
Levels of civic culture in East and West
This study is decidedly not the first to examine differences in civic culture in East and West. In recent years many studies have explored levels of civicness in the two regions and their relation to political and economic processes. Raiser et al (2001) for instance found levels of social capital (interpersonal trust and civic participation) to be significantly lower in the East. Interestingly, they show that trust is not related to economic growth in the transition countries while it is positively correlated with growth in the OECD countries. Civic participation, on the other hand, is correlated with economic performance in both regions, a relation Raiser et al attribute to the ability of civic organizations to facilitate information exchange, reduce the cost of enforcement and offer interest groups the opportunity to participate in the political process. Using data from the mid-1990s, they also observe that social capital, in its turn, is negatively affected by income inequality, leading them to suggest that redistributive policies could be an effective way of increasing social and political trust. Examining the link between social capital and democratization, Dowley and Silver (2002) found no correlation between aggregate indicators of social capital and Freedom House measures on political rights and civil liberties for 20 post-communist states. At the individual level, however, they did find a relationship between social capital and attitudes supportive of democracy. Most notably, they discovered contrasting patterns for titular majorities and ethnic minorities. While there was a positive correlation between civic participation and support for democracy among the titular group, the reverse relationship applied for members of ethnic minorities, i.e. the more active members were less trusting of democratic institutions than the more passive ones. In ethnically diverse societies the links between social capital and democracy can thus be quite different from those seen in homogenous societies. While also examining social trust and civic participation, Uslaner (2003) is more concerned with their determinants than with their effects. He finds that the same set of factors influences trust and participation in the two regions despite their diverging political histories and different levels of civic mindedness. Consequently, he concludes that the socio-psychological mechanisms shaping civic attitudes have cross-regional validity.
What distinguishes the current study from the ones reviewed above is that it is much broader in scope, covering not just trust and participation but all the aspects of civic culture. Second, it explores the durability of civic culture in the two regions and in the transition countries in particular. It does so by introducing three perspectives on civic culture and by assessing to what extent the pattern of aggregate civic attitudes found in the WVS and EVS data matches the expected outcomes of these perspectives. Each of the perspectives assigns a different degree of stability to civic culture and predicts a different pattern of attitudes. The historical perspective locates the phenomenon in the distant past and assumes it to be highly resilient to the political and economic conditions prevailing at a given time in modern history. As noted before, it links civic culture to the emergence of independent cities and middle classes in some regions of Western Europe. Consequently, it expects civic culture to be stronger in Western Europe than in Eastern Europe. The communist perspective outlined in the previous section sees civic culture as a more elastic phenomenon that is not as immune to political events as the historical perspective claims. It argues that communism either destroyed civic traditions or prevented civic values from developing in the countries where it monopolized political life. The main fault line regarding civic values is thus predicted to run along the former Iron Curtain. As noted above, the current study also uses this cleavage to identify "Eastern" and "Western" nations.
At first sight, it seems difficult to assess which of these two perspectives has most explanatory power since both seemingly predict the same outcome (West-civic vs Eastuncivic). On close inspection, however, there are differences. The historical perspective assumes only some regions in the West to have strong civic traditions (England, France, Switzerland, the Low Countries, the British settler colonies). In the more peripheral parts of this region and notably in countries with a history of top-down modernization and (foreign) authoritarian rule (Germany, Austria, Greece, southern Italy, Spain, Portugal) or a legacy of semi-feudal relations exacerbated by religious divisions (Ireland), civic culture is expected to be underdeveloped. Likewise it predicts some variation among the former communist states, considering countries with a Standenstaat tradition -such as Bohemia (the Czech Republic) until the imposition of Austrian absolute rule in the seventeenth century (Anderson 1974) -and with a legacy of close economic ties with the West (the Baltics) to have stronger civic institutions than the isolated feudal societies further east. Thus, the historical perspective would predict almost as much variation within each region, certainly within the West, as between East and West. The communist perspective would not deny variation within the postcommunist world as both the duration and nature of communist rule differed from country to country. Yet it anticipates more variation between the postcommunist countries and the western market economies than within these regions, and most definitely on the indicators of civic culture that refer to citizen-state relations and attitudes towards strangers or ethnic others.
In the third perspective civic culture is an even more flexible phenomenon, affected not only by long term regime policies but also and above all by sudden and drastic socio-economic changes. This we might call the transition perspective, which obviously has particular relevance for the postcommunist states. In this view, the socioeconomic restructuring following the collapse of communism and the inability of the new democratic institutions to enforce the law, offer moral guidance and guarantee a basic level of economic livelihood gave rise to profound feelings of existential insecurity and helplessness. Under these conditions people developed a deep distrust of politicians and institutions and withdrew into the small circles of family, friends and ethnic kin to retain some measure of control over their lives. According to Snyder (1993, p. 86) ethnic nationalism was the logical consequence of these processes: "It [ethnic nationalism] predominates when institutions collapse, when existing institutions are not fulfilling people"s basic needs, and when satisfactory alternative structures are not readily available". Inglehart and Welzel (2005, p. 141) similarly stress that "Existential threats drive people to seek safety in closely knit groups (…). Under conditions of insecurity, social capital is bonding rather than bridging". What pattern of civic attitudes would the transition perspective predict? It would anticipate that civic attitudes by and large correspond to economic trends in the transition period. This means that levels of civic consciousness should be at their nadir at the same time as or soon after the moment the economy starts to grow after several years of sharp decline. For some countries this turning point happened before 1995 (Poland, the Baltic republics) while others had to wait for the end of the 1990s for this to occur (Ukraine, Russia). However in all postcommunist states there should be a sharp decline in civic values after the fall of communism. Some, the transition perspective predicts, will already have recovered from the mid-1990 malaise by the close of the decade, others will still show a declining trend. I will use World Bank data and the 1990, 1995 and 1999 waves of the WVS to explore the validity of the transition perspective.
First I explore the explanatory power of the historical and communist perspectives. Table 6 presents the country aggregate values on the 12 indicators of civic culture. To facilitate interpretation the countries are ranked, with the postcommunist and western countries printed in bold and normal style respectively. This allows the reader to determine at a single glance whether Eastern countries cluster at either the top or bottom end of the scale. The top end always signifies strong civic culture. As we can see, western countries, as a group, exhibit significantly higher levels of civic consciousness than postcommunist societies on nearly all indicators. Only on civic honesty and political discussions compatriots unjustly claiming state benefits and discussing politics with friends is the difference in mean scores between the regions not significant or in the other direction, respectively. These findings broadly support both perspectives. The real test is the degree and nature of variation within each of the regions.
Table 6 about here
To begin with the historical perspective, it can be seen that the countries in the West that are expected to have strong civic traditions indeed top the rankings on a good many indicators (particularly the Nordics, the former British settler colonies and the Netherlands). Vice versa, the "uncivic" countries in the West generally display only average values on most indicators (Germany, Austria, Italy) with some occasionally showing very low scores even in relation to the postcommunist countries (cf. Portugal on social trust and passive and active participation; Malta on the two indicators of equality). Likewise, in the East the historically more "civic" states perform well across a range of indicators (Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia and Latvia), whereas the countries in the Balkans and the Caucasus generally trail the rankings. Yet, there are also plenty of surprises. In the West, Britain and France have remarkably low scores for "civic" nations on many indicators. "Uncivic" Spain has high values on civic honesty and on the two tolerance indicators. In the East "uncivic" Slovakia does very well across a range of indicators, and "uncivic" Belarus has high scores on the two trust items. Moreover, country scores can fluctuate widely across indicators. Portugal for instance trails the ranking order on social trust but tops the one on ethnic tolerance. Similarly, Greeks are surprisingly active participants but have a dim view of the civic honesty of their compatriots. These large cross-indicator differences confirm the observation above that the internal consistency of civic culture is not very impressive. More importantly and to the detriment of the historical perspective, they also suggest that country specific factors and religion have a substantial impact on civic values.
The data of Table 6 provide an equally mixed pattern of support for the communist perspective. On the one hand, the country rankings on political activity, ethnic equality, social trust and ethnic tolerance are in line with the expectation in a sense that the postcommunist countries almost en bloc occupy the lower half of the scales. These are moreover precisely the indicators on which the regions are expected to diverge most strongly. The higher average scores of postcommunist countries on political discussions is also anticipated as this particular indicator is likely to tap the informal type of social capital considered to be so salient in the East. On the other hand, the communist perspective cannot account for the lack of regional differentiation on civic honesty. This indicator par excellence should show a substantial difference as citizen-state relations in the East are purportedly marked by mutual hostility and abuse. Equally disturbing for the theory is the substantial variation among the transition states on ethnic tolerance an the two association indicators.
The survey data discussed here thus do not express a clear preference for either of the two perspectives. Both perspectives are supported in a more or less equal measure. In order to fully appreciate the durability of civic culture, however, the validity of the transition perspective needs to be examined. I assessed civic trends in those transition states that participated in all three WVS waves (1990-1991; 1995-1997; 1999-2000) since the demise of communism. Figure 1 shows the economic performance of these states during the 1990s measured in GNP per capita. Except for Poland and Slovenia whose economies started to recover at a very early stage, the other six states experienced a sharp decline in the early nineties and had to wait for the turning point until 1993-95. Towards the end of the millennium their economies had not yet reached their pre-independence levels. Consequently, the transition perspective would expect civic attitudes in these states to fall sharply between 1990 and 1995, to reach their lowest point in the mid-1990s and to show a modest recovery thereafter. In Slovenia and Poland levels of civic attitudes should be higher at the close of the decade than at the beginning. Table 7 presents the developments in civic values on six indicators of civic culture.
5 It can be seen that the transition perspective works reasonably well for social trust, political discussions and political activity. The majority of countries display the expected mid 1990s dip on these indicators and in only three countries, two of them being Poland and Slovenia on political activity, are levels of civic values higher on the eve of the third millennium. Nonetheless there are also unexpected trends. Latvian levels of social trust first rise and then decline. In Poland civic values are stronger at the beginning of the 1990s than at the end (with the exception of political activity). What is also slightly difficult for the transition perspective to digest is that the fluctuations are fairly small. Levels of social trust remain low and the frequency of discussing politics remains high throughout the 1990s. Only the trends on political activity almost perfectly match the predicted pattern. Thus, the socio-economic transformation seems not to have impacted on civic values to the extent that the transition perspective expected. More damaging for the perspective is that the trends on the other indicators are not at all following the anticipated pattern. Developments on ethnic equality and ethnic tolerance are in all kinds of directions. What can be observed is the persistent consensus across the board (Estonia excepting) that it is legitimate to give priority to co-nationals over immigrants when jobs are scarce (i.e. low levels of ethnic equality). Truly spectacular, however, are the steep upward trends on gender equality and sexual tolerance. During the nineties people in the eight transition states, and most notably in the Baltics, have become much more accepting of homosexuals and have embraced the idea of gender equality in ever higher numbers, contrary to the prediction of the transition perspective. Possibly, these trends are not so much linked to socio-economic restructuring but to the change from a secluded communist society to an open democratic one absorbing cultural influences from the West.
Reviewing the empirical evidence for the three perspectives, the rather unsatisfactory conclusion has to be drawn that there is some measure of support for all three of them. In other words, civic culture is a function of both slowly evolving historical processes and short and medium term political and economic developments. The support for each of the three perspectives, however, varies from country to country, which suggests that country specific factors have a strong bearing on civic culture as well. It also varies from indicator to indicator. The historical perspective is endorsed by political activity, social trust and passive and active participation as the allegedly strong civic nations top the rankings on these indicators and the "uncivic" nations are at the bottom end. The communist perspective is supported by those indicators on which the difference between the former communist world and the West is the largest, i.e. ethnic equality, sexual tolerance, and, once again, political activity. The transition perspective relies above all on political activity (yet again!) and to a lesser extent on social trust and discussing politics, as the trends on these indicators are as anticipated. Paradoxically, the variation on one single indicator (political activity) matches the predicted outcome of all three perspectives simultaneously. This illustrates as no other that all three perspectives seem to have a more or less equal measure of explanatory power. In a broader sense, theories that assume cultural dispositions to react strongly to recent events are corroborated by the drastically changing attitudes on gender equality and sexual tolerance in the transition states. The variation between indicators, moreover, underlines the observation above that civic culture is a highly heterogeneous concept as it includes notions that are highly responsive to recent events and notions which seem to have a fair amount of durability. Interestingly, though focussing on secular-rational values and selfexpression values, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) arrive at remarkably similar conclusions regarding the tenacity of culture and the main factors impinging on it. They find that age old religious traditions, national idiosyncrasies, the legacy of communism and more recent socio-economic developments all exert a powerful influence on a society"s value system. The influence of these factors however differs from value complex to value complex. Cultural legacies have a relatively greater impact on secular-rational values, while the dynamic of modernization can best account for changes in self-expression values.
Conclusion
Using WVS and EVS data to assess patterns of civic attitudes in East and West, this article has demonstrated that civic culture is not as coherent a set of attitudes as some cultural theorists, Putnam first of all, claim it is. At the individual level, the attitudes commonly associated with civic culture do not cluster to a sufficient degree for them to be clearly distinguished from other groups of dispositions. Moreover, there are geographical variations in the nature of civic culture as the correlations between civic attitudes are weaker in the East than in the West. When tested empirically, the theoretical notion of civic culture thus not only constitutes a rather arbitrary collection of attitudes in the individual"s mind, it also assumes different characteristics across regions. Civic values cluster slightly better at the societal level, but they do not form a convincing clearly demarcated one-dimensional syndrome at that level either. Even the more focused notion of social capital appears to be more a bi-than mono-dimensional phenomenon at the macro level, which is bad news for theorists who contend that it has the properties of a public good.
This study has also found civic culture to be significantly weaker in the former communist states across a wide range of indicators. The question it sought to answer is whether this difference is rooted in the pre-modern past or whether it is the consequence of more recent developments. In other words, how persistent are civic values and how insensitive are they to political and economic events? As it turns out, the data examined in this paper only partially support the notion that civic culture is a durable phenomenon. If it had been as durable as claimed, the pattern of civic attitudes across western countries and transition states would have closely matched the one expected by the historical perspective, which traces the roots of civic culture back to medieval times. Instead, the historical perspective correctly predicts the variation on only some attitudes in only some countries. The patterns on other attitudes are more in line with the expected outcomes of the legacy of communism perspective and the post-communist transition theory. These perspectives may be said to rival with the historical perspective in that they assign a higher degree of pliability to civic culture. Furthermore, the trends on two attitudes, gender equality and sexual tolerance, show such a spectacular and unexpected increase throughout the 1990s in several transition societies, that other factors not explored in this study are likely to have impacted on civic values as well. Yet, it must be borne in mind that this study, by relying on survey data that cover a time span of no more than ten years, could only partially explore the persistence of civic attitudes. Examining trends of civic culture across much larger time intervals, in a manner that Putnam has done for Italy, would have produced stronger conclusions.
Summing up, civic culture seems not to be the coherent and durable phenomenon that some theorists assume it to be. This has two implications. First, the continued use of the term "civic culture" should be questioned. Is seems wiser to rearrange the conceptual labelling and grouping of civic values to arrive at syndromes which include more restricted but more coherent sets of values. Even the more parsimonious notion of social capital and the elements it is said to include in this sense needs revision. An interesting direction of future research, therefore, would be to identify these syndromes, to examine their durability across a substantial period of time, and to assess the extent to which democracy and socio-economic development depend on them. Second, because civic values would appear to be at least as much the result of recent economic and political processes as the outcome of path dependencies, "uncivic" regions are not doomed to be burdened with authoritarian cultures and atomized societies forever. This is positive news for all those who believe that civic values are a crucial condition for democracy. * The WVS asked respondents whether they belonged to and did voluntary work for the following types of organizations: social welfare for elderly, handicapped or deprived people; religious or church organizations; education, arts, music or cultural activities; labor unions; political parties or groups; local community action on issues like poverty, employment, housing, racial equality; third world development or human rights; conservation, environment, animal rights groups; professional associations; youth work; sports or recreation; women"s groups; peace movement; voluntary organizations concerned with health; other groups. It needs to be underlined that this measure only asked respondents whether they belonged to one or more organizations of each single type. Thus it does not measure the variation of membership within each type. .16** .13** -.08** * P < .05 ** P < .01 NB1: Correlations larger than 0.1 are printed in bold. NB2: Unexpected correlations between civic culture items (negative signs) are underlined. NB3: The scales of some of the other indices have been reversed so that positive correlations always express the regularity that higher levels of civicness are linked with higher levels of education, stronger feelings of happiness, and more importance attached to leasure. NB4: The N ranges from 35,000 to 60,000 respondents in the cells. .45** .50** .60** * P < .05 ** P < .01 NB1: All correlations with a significance of 99% or larger are printed in bold. NB2: Unexpected correlations between civic culture items (negative signs) are underlined. NB3: For the country aggregate values on the civic indices and the way they were calculated, see Table 6 . The aggregate values on the education indicator are mean scores. The aggregate values on the feeling happy indicator are the addition soms of the individual responses "very happy" and "quite happy". Similarly the aggregate values on the leisure indicator represent "very important" and "rather important". NB4: The N ranges from 30 to 46 countries in the cells. .62** -* P < .05 ** P < .01 NB1: Correlations larger than 0.1 are printed in bold. NB2: insignificant correlations and correlations with an unexpected sign are underlined. NB3: The N ranges from 15,000 to 30,000 respondents in the cells.
